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NOTE
THE JUSTICIABILITY OF FAIR BALANCE UNDER THE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: TOWARD A
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS APPROACH
Daniel E. Walters*
The FederalAdvisory Committee Act's requirementthat advisory committees be 'fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the
functions to be performed" is generally considered either nonjusticiable
under the Administrative ProcedureAct orjusticiablebut subject to highly
deferential review. These approaches stem from courts'purportedinability
to discern from the text of the statute any meaningful legal standardsfor
policing representationalbalance. Thus, the Federal Advisory Committee
Act's most important substantive limitation on institutional pathologies
such as committee "capture" or domination is generally unused despite
the ubiquity offederal advisory committees in the modern regulatory state.
This Note argues for a new reading of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act's fair balance provision that would make the provision justiciable.
Instead of reading the provision to require quantitative representational
balancing of various interests--andthus asking courts to make political
decisions-thisNote contends that the text of the provision permits an alternative reading, which I call the "deliberativeprocess" reading. Under
this reading, courts would decide whether a committee's record airs all
of the relevant viewpoints associated with the issue under the committee's consideration. This kind of review is familiar to courts in other
administrative law contexts, so there would be no plausible argument
that the provision is unreviewablefor lack of meaningful standards.I argue that this deliberative process reading would enhance advisory
outputs and ensure that this "fifth branch" of government is still under
public control.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2009, President Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act,1 which explicitly gave authority to the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") to regulate tobacco. 2 The FDA took immediate
action on a variety of fronts, including-seemingly least controversial of
all-convening the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee
("TPSAC").3 The Act provides for a variety of committee studies of the ad-4
dictive qualities of nicotine and requires the committee to advise the FDA.
The committee includes seven healthcare professionals, one government
employee, and one representative of the "general public," all of whom are to
be voting members.5 In addition, the Act provides for two nonvoting representatives of the tobacco manufacturing industry and one nonvoting
representative of tobacco growers.6
By March 2010, the TPSAC was embroiled in controversy. First, Altria
Group, Inc., the parent corporation of Philip Morris USA, submitted a letter
to the FDA commissioner protesting the appointments of four voting members of the committee because of their alleged conflicts of interest.7 While
these members were experts, they were also routinely retained as expert
1.
atAl5.

Jeff Zeleny, OccasionalSmoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009,

2.

Id.
3. See News Release, FDA, Tobacco Control Act One Year Anniversary (June 22,
2010), availableat 2010 WL 2546982 (MEDWATCH) (noting the launch of the TPSAC).
4. 21 U.S.C.A. § 387q(c) (West 2010).
5. 21 U.S.C.A. § 387q(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).
6.

Id.
7. Letter from Denise F. Keane, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Altria Group,
Inc., to Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., and
Lawrence W. Dayton, Dir., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods. (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://
www.altria.com/en/cms/About-Altria/federal-regulation-of-tobacco/regulatory-filings/
pdfs/Letter-Announcement-of-TPSAC-Voting-Members-and-FDA-response.pdf.aspx.
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witnesses by plaintiffs in civil cases against tobacco companies and as consultants by pharmaceutical companies that manufacture smoking cessation
products. 8 Soon after Altria's challenges, the nonpartisan but left-leaning
political watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington became a strange bedfellow of Altria, criticizing the FDA for its failure
to resolve longstanding problems with pharmaceutical industry capture. 9
While some commentators concluded that the TPSAC was a "virtual smor-

gasbord of tobacco and pharmaceutical financial interests" 0 which might
make even Nick Naylor blush, II others defended the FDA, noting that "this
is not Coke versus Pepsi.... The tobacco companies are promoting products that kill half a million people a year. The pharmaceutical companies are

trying to promote health."12

Federal advisory committees like the TPSAC are ubiquitous, 3 and, as

the TPSAC story shows, they raise critical issues of accountability, credibility, and neutrality in policymaking. Of chief concern is the question of
balance and the avoidance of capture or domination by well-organized and
overrepresented groups.' 4 Advisory committees are frequently homogenous
8. Id.
9. Letter from Melanie Sloan, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Wash., to Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (June 7,
2010), available at http://www.citizensforethics.org/page/-/pdfslegal/investigation/CREWLetter toHHSIGTPSAC_Conflicts_20100607.pdf~nocdn=l.
10. Michael Siegel, Four Members of FDA Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee Have Received PharmaceuticalMoney; Influence of Industry on FDA Grows, THE
REST OF THE STORY: TOBACCO NEWS ANALYSIS & COMMENT. (Mar. 2, 2010, 2:11 PM),
http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/03/four-members-of-fda-tobacco-products.html.
11. See THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2005).
12. Duff Wilson, Group Objects to 2 Members of Tobacco Safety Panel, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2010, at B3.
13. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-61 IT, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE OF ADVISORY
COMMITTEES 1 (2008) [hereinafter INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE], available at http://

www.gao.gov/new.items/d0861 It.pdf ("In fiscal year 2007, 52 agencies sponsored 915 active
federal advisory committees with a total of about 65,000 members.").
14. "Regulatory capture" is a useful way of referring to the collection of arguments
from public choice theory, highly influential in federal courts during the 1960s and 1970s, that
regulatory agencies are particularly vulnerable to co-optation by industry or special interest
groups and are thereby distracted or prevented from pursuing the public interest. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 105052 (1997). For specific examples of early capture theories, see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 80, 87 (1955), and ROGER G. NOLL,
BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING REGULATION 40-43 (1971). Classic capture theory argues,
more narrowly, that well-organized interests have organizational advantages over a diffuse
public when it comes to organizing votes, and that they use that advantage to deal with elected
officials and to ensure that bureaucracy serves their interests. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard
L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-85
(2006). Some scholars now argue that the rubric of "domination" is a more apt term for more
subtle forms of industry orientation, including the relationship between agencies and interests
in the information gathering process. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible
Regulation and Constraintson Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999).
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and draw from select demographics. 15 Even worse, committees may simply
be so beholden to their parent agencies that they become back doors through
which capture-hungry parties can wield disproportionate influence before
the public even has an opportunity to comment. 16 Thus, while the establishment and staffing of committees like the TPSAC may seem innocuous, the
danger of capture, domination, and unaccountability is acute in the absence
of sufficient safeguards.
Congress recognized these dangers when it passed the Federal Advisory
Committee Act of 1972 ("FACA"). 17 FACA was a response to the proliferation of federal advisory committees and to concerns about the
unaccountability, bias, and costs of the advisory process. 8 FACA imposed a
number of accountability mechanisms, including procedural constraints on
committees as well as oversight and reporting requirements for congressional committees, the General Services Administration ("GSA"), and the
President.19 Today, many of the same concerns that prompted FACA persist;
they are recognized in popular media,20 studied22in scholarly literature outside of law, 21 and raised in the halls of Congress.

15. See Kevin D. Karty, Membership Balance, Open Meetings, and Effectiveness in
FederalAdvisory Committees, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 414, 417 (2005) (providing aggregate statistics on committee membership and noting that it is not at all uncommon for business
interests to dominate particular advisory committees).
16. Cf Frederick R. Anderson, Improving Scientific Advice to Government, 19 ISSUES
ScL. & TECH. 34 (2003) (noting that the Scientific Advisory Board at the Environmental Protection Agency may be so close to the agency that its recommendations cannot be viewed as
accountable).
17. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1-16 (2006)).
18. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 (1989) ("FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful expenditure of public funds for worthless

committee meetings and biased proposals... ).
19. Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282, 284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
20. E.g., Robin Bravender et al., New Policy on Lobbyists Could Spur Shake-Up for
EPA Advisory Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/
04/04greenwire-new-policy-on-lobbyists-could-spur-shake-up-fo-42663.html;
Gardiner Harris, Advisers on Vaccines Often Have Conflicts, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at
A28.
21. E.g., Kevin D. Karty, Closure and Capture in FederalAdvisory Committees, 4 Bus.
& POL. 213 (2002); Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and FederalAdvisory Committees,
350 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1454 (2004). Importantly, some political scientists have marshaled
empirical evidence to show that concerns about numerical balance on at least one extant
committee may be overstated. See St6phane Lavertu et al., Scientific Expertise and the Balance of PoliticalInterests: MEDCAC and Medicare Coverage Decisions, J. PuB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY (2011). The legal literature has occasionally addressed FACA, but has generally
steered away from the question of balance. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The
FederalAdvisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997)
(discussing the full range of issues that have come up under FACA).
22. See Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2009, H.R. 1320, 111 th
Cong. (2009); see also H.R. REP. No. 111-135 (2009) (summarizing the main contributions of
the proposed amendments).
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Surprisingly, federal courts have let perhaps the most important substantive check on capture and domination in FACA lie essentially dormant.
Section 5(b)(2) requires that the membership of federal advisory committees
be "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee. 23 Several circuits have

split on whether section 5(b)(2) provides any meaningful legal standard under which courts can police the representational balance of committees

without making overtly political judgments: two circuits treat section
5(b)(2) as nonjusticiable 4 under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 25 while at least two other circuits treat the provision as justiciable. 26 Even where section 5(b)(2) is found justiciable, courts invariably hold

that they must give agencies substantial deference in composing committee
membership.27 Underlying all of these decisions is an assumption that repre-

requires, if anything, direct representation by
sentation under section 5(b)(2)
28
directly affected interests.

This Note argues that the "fairly balanced" provision of FACA is justiciable under the APA, but under a different reading of the statute than the one
currently used by courts. Part I examines the reasons offered by the differing

circuits for their respective approaches. It argues that the unifying feature
among section 5(b)(2) cases is the courts' representational reading of the
statute. Part II then argues that this representational reading creates four
23. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. app. (2006). This lack of enforcement is not due to a lack of suits. Indeed, the TPSAC episode ultimately resulted in the
filing of a suit based in part on section 5(b)(2). See Duff Wilson, Lorillard and Reynolds Sue
FD.A., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B7.
24. See, e.g., Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2008); cf Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory
Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman,
J., concurring) (laying out the case for nonjusticiability that courts in the District of Columbia
Circuit have subsequently followed).
25. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2006). Under the APA,
a delegation of administrative authority that is so broad as to be considered "committed to
agency discretion by law" is unreviewable in court. Id. § 701(a)(2). Courts consider this requirement to be met only when a statute is "drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 830 (1985). However, such commission to agency discretion is generally to be
avoided, as there is a presumption of reviewability. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140-41 (1967); Newman v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2000). Typically, the courts
refer to statutes with "no meaningful" standard as "unreviewable," but most courts refer to
them as nonjusticiable in the FACA context.
26. See, e.g., Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1232-34 (10th Cir. 2004);
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 1999); cf Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep't of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103 (lth Cir. 1994) (upholding a district court's
decision to issue an injunction under section 5(b) but not clarifying which specific provisions
within section 5(b) were violated, strongly suggesting that section 5(b)(2) is justiciable).
27. See, e.g., Cargill, 173 F.3d at 335 n.24.
28. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit paraphrased the requirements of section 5(b)(2) as
requiring a "fair and balanced composition of the committee." Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers

Coal., 26 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis added).
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difficulties that plague section 5(b)(2) cases and leaves the provision effectively unenforceable. Part III examines a potential alternative reading that
would look to the robustness of the process of deliberation in advisory
committees. It argues that this alternative reading is not only textually plausible but also accords with the overall purpose of FACA. Finally, Part III
concludes by briefly addressing some of the most important concerns about
the implementation of the deliberative process standard.
I.

CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF THE JUSTICIABILITY OF
THE "FAIRLY BALANCED" PROVISION

The federal courts of appeals have failed to converge on a universal approach for dealing with section 5(b)(2). The courts are split on the issue of
the justiciability of the provision under the APA. 2 9
A. Nonjusticiability

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had several
early chances to resolve the question of the justiciability of section 5(b)(2)
but failed to offer any definitive interpretation. The court at first noted in
dicta that the question of fair balance might be justiciable, 30 but it divided
deeply on that question when it was squarely presented in Public Citizen v.
National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteriafor Foods.31 At

issue in that case was the U.S. Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") staffing of its National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for
Foods, a committee formed to assess the safety and wholesomeness of
food. 32 The charter of the committee provided that members were to be selected for expertise in food service, microbiology, or other relevant
disciplines.33 The final committee roster included two academics, one state
department of agriculture official, one consumer services official also from
the state department of agriculture, two food researchers employed by research firms, six employees of federal agencies, and six individuals
employed in the food industry.34 The plaintiffs-appellants alleged that the
committee was unbalanced under section 5(b)(2) because it did not have a
consumer representative with public health expertise and was in fact stacked
with members who had industry ties. 35 The court issued a per curiam opin-

29.

See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
30. See Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court's

dismissal of the claims but engaging the merits of the fair balance claim in dicta).
31.
32.

886 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See MicrobiologicalCriteria,886 F.2d at 420 (Friedman, J., concurring).

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 420-22.
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ion, and two of the three judges on the panel wrote separately3 6to express
their view that the district court did not err in dismissing the suit.
The lasting legacy of Microbiological Criteria is its articulation of the
rationale for nonjusticiability. Judge Silberman, in his partial concurrence,
claimed in stark terms that section 5(b)(2) was nonjusticiable on its face. He
reasoned that, taking the language of FACA literally, it is "quite artificial
and arbitrary" for judges to try to "reduce point of view to a few categories"
in order to facilitate a balancing of viewpoints.37 Moreover, doing so poses a
risk of politicization, he argued, because the only manageable way to reduce
the number of categories is to treat viewpoints "as if they were political parties. '3 8 Pointing to the ostensibly benign claim of the plaintiffs that
consumers must have a representative on the committee,39 Judge Silberman

noted that even defining "consumer representative" poses problems for
judges, because that category typically includes representatives of "one
philosophical, ideological, and political view of consumer welfare" urging
"greater governmental regulation of the production of goods or services in
the marketplace." That definition excludes the kind of antiregulatory ideologies that might still largely be theories of consumer well-being. 40 Judge
Silberman concluded that the language of FACA provides no legal basis for
determining fair balance 41 and thus fails the "no meaningful law to apply"
standard.

42

The other two opinions in Microbiological Criteria were more receptive to justiciability. First, in agreeing that the case was properly dismissed,
Judge Friedman offered a compromise standard for justiciability, noting that
the definition of fair balance "necessarily lies largely within the discretion of
the official who appoints the committee. '43 While cognizant of concerns about
capture or domination,' Judge Friedman's standard suggested a high bar:
only when industry is the sole group represented on the committee can a

36.
37.

Id. at 419-20 (per curiam).
See id. at 426-27 (Silberman, J., concurring).

38.
39.

See id. at 427.
Id. at 428.

40.
41.
42.

Id. at 429.
Id. at 429-30.
See supra note 25.

43. MicrobiologicalCriteria,886 F.2d at 419. Judge Friedman's approach thus draws a
distinction between the question of justiciability and the question of balance on the merits in
order to set aside these difficult questions for a later time. See Reply Brief for PlaintiffsAppellants at 2-5, Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, 540 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-16682), 2007 WL 649145
("Whether a committee is actually imbalanced and, if so, how to remedy that imbalance goes

to the merits of the claim, whereas the question here is the justiciability of the fair balance
provision."). This approach seems only to delay the inevitable.
44. Microbiological Criteria,886 F.2d at 424 (Friedman, J., concurring) ("One of the
great dangers in the unregulated use of advisory committees is that special interest groups may
use their membership on such bodies to promote their private concerns.").
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claim of lack of fair balance proceed.45 Thus, while Judge Friedman did
not actually say that section 5(b)(2) is nonjusticiable, his highly deferential
standard of review is tantamount to holding as much.
In contrast, Judge Edwards cautioned against the tendency toward judicial abdication, noting that Judge Silberman's opinion failed to give
46
sufficient weight to the standard presumption in favor of judicial review.
As Judge Edwards noted in arguing for unconditional justiciability, "[it

does not matter that the 'fairly balanced' requirement falls short of mathematical precision in application, or that it may involve some balancing of
interests by the agency. The presumption in favor47 of judicial review is not
altered in the face of a diffuse statutory directive.
Microbiological Criteria is long on reasoning but short on practical
guidance for lower courts. Though the Microbiological Criteriacourt did
not issue a holding on the justiciability issue, Judge Silberman's opinion
appears to have carried the day in the D.C. district court, where judges
regularly dismiss section 5(b)(2) cases after finding the provision unre-49
viewable 41-sometimes with the explicit approval of the court of appeals
as well as of the scholarly literature.50 Courts in the circuit have occasionally
hinted that a more specific statute or regulation with language analogous to
that of section 5(b)(2) could
be justiciable," but more recent cases seem to
52
foreclose even this option.
Almost twenty years after Microbiological Criteria, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also held in favor of nonjusticiability. The case
concerned fair balance in the membership of an industry trade advisory
45. Id. at 425 (describing another committee "where the only individuals who met with
government officials were representatives of industry" and concluding that the membership in
the case at hand "cannot properly be so described").
46. Id. at 432-33 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that
there is a presumption of reviewability under the APA).
47.

Id. at 434.

48. See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 938 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D.D.C. 1996); Doe v. Shalala,
862 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (D.D.C. 1994).
49. See, e.g., Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 906 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting approvingly the district court's indication that it would follow Judge Silberman's
nonjusticiability reasoning).
50. See, e.g., Croley & Funk, supra note 21, at 530 (arguing that the GSA should create
additional regulations to provide courts with law to apply when determining whether the "fairly balanced" requirements of section 5(b)(2) have been met).
51. Compare FertilizerInst., 938 F. Supp. at 55 (suggesting in dicta that the minimum
number of industry representatives specified in the committee's charter "does appear to provide a clearer standard for review"), with Shalala, 862 F. Supp. at 1424, 1430-31 (giving little
consideration to the substantially detailed requirements imposed by the organic statute that
included, among other things, a requirement that there be "at least one attorney, one ethicist,
one practicing physician, one theologian, and no fewer than 1/3 but no more than 1/2, of 'scientists with substantial accomplishments in biomedical or behavioral research'" (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 289a-l(b)(5)(C))).
52. See, e.g., Gamble v. Zoellick, No. OICV0018, 2001 WL 1823812, at *4-5 (D.D.C.
May 8, 2001) (finding the provisions of the Trade Act pertaining to committee appointments
nonjusticiable).
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committee ("ITAC") convened by the United States Trade Representative
and the United States Department of Commerce. 3 The ITACs are part of a
public-private partnership designed to "ensure industry has a voice in formulating the trade policy of the United States."' They are commissioned
pursuant to the authority of the Trade Act, which simply provides that
ITACs "shall, insofar as is practicable, be representative of all industry, labor, agricultural, or service interests (including small business interests) in
the sector or functional areas concerned."55 The Center for Policy Analysis
on Trade and Health claimed that the ITACs lacked any members with5 6public health backgrounds and therefore violated section 5(b)(2) of FACA.
The Ninth Circuit held that neither the Trade Act nor FACA supplied
any meaningful standard by which to judge compliance with section 5(b)(2),
and so held the provision nonjusticiable as applied to the ITACs. 57 In doing
so, the court acknowledged that it was theoretically possible that the Trade
Act could allow for review of section 5(b)(2) claims by providing sufficiently reviewable specificity about composition. 8 But the court found no such
specificity here: "[The Trade Act] provides no standards to allow us to determine when it is, or when it is not, practicable to appoint a certain interest
onto one of the ITACs."59 Similarly, the court recognized that hypothetical
regulations promulgated by a parent agency to provide additional specificity
about the requirements for balance on a committee might allow for a fair
balance claim. But again, the court noted that there were no such regulations
in the case before it.6°
Ultimately, the court somewhat misleadingly claimed that it was not
holding section 5(b)(2) nonjusticiable in all circumstances. 61 In effect, however, the court did hold that section 5(b)(2), standing alone, is nonjusticiable
in all circumstances by declaring that "FACA does not, for example, articulate what perspectives must be considered when determining if the advisory
committee is fairly balanced. 62 If a section 5(b)(2) claim is to go forward in
the Ninth Circuit, it will only be because additional statutes or regulations,
acting alongside the requirements of section 5(b)(2), provide enough specificity about a particular committee's proper balance to provide meaningful
53. Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 540 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008).
54. History of the Industry Trade Advisory Committees, INT'L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://trade.gov/itac/history.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
55. CPATH, 540 F.3d at 942 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2155(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
56. Id. at 943.
57. Id. at 945.
58.
59.
60.
sufficient

See id.
Id.
Id. at 947 (reasoning that "additional regulations might, in some circumstances, be
to result in a reviewable controversy under the APA," but holding that "no such regu-

lations exist in this case").
61.

Id.

62.

See id. at 945.
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standards by which judges can evaluate agency action. The court was entirely silent, though, about what kind of statutory or regulatory context would
be needed to support a section 5(b)(2) claim. All that the court offered were
to
conclusory remarks that the Trade Act provided "no meaningful standards
64
apply. 63 The Ninth Circuit is thus solidly in the nonjusticiability camp.
B. Justiciability

In contrast with the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that section 5(b)(2) of FACA is justiciable
standing alone. In Cargill, Inc. v. United States,6" the court considered

whether the Board of Scientific Counselors ("BSC") under the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") was fairly balanced
in compliance with section 5(b)(2) of FACA. BSC's mandate was to "provide ... advice from experts in diesel exhaust, diesel exposure assessment,
and the mining environment."66 A group concerned about the balance of the
BSC and the possibility that its study would lead to unnecessarily stringent
regulation of diesel exposure to mine workers brought suit to enjoin the
agency from further relying on the BSC.67

The Cargill court's analysis, while brief, represents the most expansive
view in the federal courts of the justiciability of section 5(b)(2). The court
drew a distinction between "functional" balance claims and "point-of-view"
balance claims, 6 and, in both instances, summarily rejected the government's nonjusticiability claims. 69 The court simply noted that the "weight of
the caselaw" was in favor of justiciability.7" On the functional balance claim,
the Cargill court followed the D.C. Circuit's approach in an older case, under which fair balance depends on the function to be performed by a
particular committee at a particular time.7 The Cargill court confronted a
63.

Id.
64. But see Idaho Wool Growers Assoc. v. Schafer, 637 F. Supp. 2d 868, 879 (D. Idaho), order clarified, CV 08-394-S-BLW, 2009 WL 3806371 (D. Idaho Nov. 9, 2009)
("Typically, a close examination of each requirement, contrasted against the circumstances in
a particular case, is warranted when determining whether a FACA violation occurred.").
65.

173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999).

66.
67.

Cargill, 173 F.3d at 328.
Id.

68. Id. at 335-38. No other court has made such a distinction. The court appeared to
frame "functional" balance claims as questions concerning whether a committee is sufficiently
numerically balanced to fulfill its specific function. "Point-of-view" balance questions, to the
court, simply ask whether the numerical balance of the committee indicates a bias.
69. Id. at 335, 337.
70. Id. at 334. Of course, this characterization is incomplete. See supra Section L.A
(describing the D.C. Circuit's equivocal treatment of section 5(b)(2)).
71. Id. at 336 ("In considering whether a committee is fairly balanced in terms of
function, courts naturally have looked first at the functions to be performed." (citing Nat'l
Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding a committee unbalanced in light of new

functions assigned to it)).
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situation in which the committee's function had changed organically over
time.7 2 The court noted that, as committee function changes, compliance
with the fair balance provision may very well change with it.73 Under this
view, courts will have to make (perhaps repeated) ad hoc adjustments to
determine whether a committee has evolved enough to justify judicial review of the committee's composition. 74 As for point-of-view balance, the
that
court held that plaintiffs "must make some kind of primafacie 7showing
5

the membership of the committee is biased in its point of view."
Though Cargill held that section 5(b)(2) is justiciable standing alone, the
court also cautioned that its holding was not a green light for unfettered judicial review. The court emphasized that "[a]gencies have considerable

discretion to determine whether an advisory committee is functionally balanced and adequately staffed. '76 While it is not clear where the Cargillcourt
believed deference should end, 77 it is worth noting that the facts of the case

and the statutory background were not measurably more judicially manageable than the facts and statutory background in the cases where the D.C.

Circuit and the Ninth Circuit found the provision nonjusticiable.
In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Wenker,75 the Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in finding section 5(b)(2) justiciable. The case involved three resource advisory councils ("RACs") that
were to provide "advice and recommendations" to the secretary of the interior and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") concerning the
management of 8.3 million acres of public lands and 27.3 million subsurface acres of mineral development areas. 79 BLM promulgated regulations
mirroring section 5(b)(2) 8 ° and requiring the secretary of the interior to provide for "balanced and broad representation" from within each of three
72. Id. at 328 (noting that the NIOSH did nothing more than circulate a letter indicating
its intent to refocus the function of the BSC).
73. Id, at 336 ("[T]he addition of peer review functions to BSC's duties could have
caused it to fail to meet the functional balance requirement of § 5.... Under FACA, agencies
should not be permitted to assign advisory committees functions that the committee members
do not have the expertise to perform. Otherwise, an agency could easily evade FACA by listing, in its advisory committee's charter, functions that are so broad as to be meaningless or are
simply different from the functions actually assigned."); cf Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec.
Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1074-76
(D.D.C. 1983) (finding that the committee was balanced in light of its clearly defined function).
74. Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey
on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (approving the district court's effort of
"characterization" of the nature and tasks of the committee at issue).
75.

Cargill, 173 F.3d at 338.

76. Id. at 336.
77. See Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Cargill decision offers little explanation of why FACA's fairly balanced requirement is justiciable.").
78.
79.
80.

353 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1225.
43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.0-1 to 1784.6-2 (1995).
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general groups of member types.81 The regulations also specified three model schemes for achieving balance.82
The Wenker court began its analysis with the conclusion that both the
Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit had found section 5(b)(2) justiciable83
standing alone, and that "no court of appeals has held to the contrary.

Noting the parallel between section 5(b)(2) and the BLM regulations, the
court determined that if section 5(b)(2) were justiciable, any additional specificity offered by the regulations must be enough to make the regulations
justiciable.' 4 The court appeared to interpret the suit as targeting compliance
with the regulations instead of with section 5(b)(2);8 5 however, it strongly
suggested in dicta that it saw section 5(b)(2) as justiciable even standing
alone.86

II.

THE REPRESENTATIONAL READING: LEGAL
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A common thread unites all of these seemingly conflicting cases: a representational reading of section 5(b)(2). The starting point for all section
5(b)(2) cases is a definition of the elements of the provision, and courts
seem to agree implicitly that the key elements-representation and fair balance-involve a numerical balance of delegates. Under this view, these
cases pose the question whether "persons or groups directly affected by the

work of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on

81.

Id. § 1784.6-1(d). The three general categories included the following groups:

(1)[Pleople with interests in federal grazing permits, transportation or rights-of-way,
outdoor recreation, commercial timber operations, or energy and mineral development;
(2) people representing nationally or regionally recognized environmental groups, 'dispersed recreational activities,' archeological and historical interests, or nationally or
regionally recognized wild horse and burro interest groups; and (3) persons who hold
state, county or local elected office, are employed by state natural resources agencies,
represent local Indian tribes, are employed as academics in natural resource management
or the natural sciences, or represent the affected public-at-large.
Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1225.
82. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1234.
83. Id. at 1232. The court cited both Cargill and MicrobiologicalCriteria as persuasive
authority for the point. Id. The court also noted that the Eleventh Circuit had seemingly
weighed in on the question. Id. (citing Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep't of Interior,
26 F.3d 1103 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
84. Id. at 1233 ("Compared to the statutes at issue in Overton Park and Microbiological
Criteria, which provided 'law to apply' even though they required 'ill-defined weighing of
interests,' the BLM regulations provide a more precise standard for determining what constitutes a fair balance of interests on the RACs.").
85. See id. ("We therefore adopt the reasoning of the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and apply
it to the fair balance requirement of 43 C.FR. §§ 1784.2-1(a) and 1784.6-1(d).").
86. Id. at 1232. It is unclear whether, in finding that section 5(b)(2) was justiciable, the
court merely pointed to other circuits as persuasive precedent or actually came to its own
conclusion on the matter.
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the committee. '8 7 Of course, there are variations (for example, opinions have
also held that entitlement to representation of every directly interested party
does not follow from this reasoning"8), but all of the cases in some manner
conceive of the question as involving a numerical or proportional balance of
directly affected interests. This reading, supposedly based on a true reading
of legislative history,89 may not be the only reasonable reading of the statute.9° More importantly, a look at the colloquy across circuits reveals that
the representational reading entangles courts in at least four separate poten-

tial or actual difficulties.
A. Unpredictabilityand Uncertainty
The representational reading does not itself provide consistent, predictable, workable standards. Thus, though some courts have found section

5(b)(2) justiciable under that reading's assumptions, their task still entails
taking on a series of analytical conundrums, which results in dissensus and
uncertainty across circuits. First, courts must decide whether a particular
litigant is part of a class of persons with interests directly affected by the

work of the committee in question. The danger is that, in review, "courts
would be obliged to make an arbitrary decision as to how attenuated an interest must be before it should be classified as 'indirect.' "9 Second, the
directly affected interest approach detracts attention from an equally troubling question-how much is some representation? 92 And more
fundamentally, why some representation and not equal representation? As

an empirical matter, the "some representation" approach often leads to
inexplicable and seemingly arbitrary results.93 The pervasive emphasis on
87. Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey
on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
88. E.g., Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Friedman, J., concurring).
89. See S. REP. No. 92-1098, at 9 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 92-1017, at 6 (1972). But see
MARK B. BROWN, SCIENCE IN DEMOCRACY 94-97 (2009) (complicating the simple history
offered by the courts).
90. See infra Section Il.A for an argument that the representational reading is in fact
not the only reasonable reading. See also infra Section I.B for an argument that the representational reading is not readily discernible in the rather uninformative and convoluted history of
FACA.
91. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 427 (Silberman, J., concurring). Judge Silberman further suggests that "interests" could be divided into economic, ideological, and
intellectual interests (at least), none of which would intuitively make any more sense than any
other category for the purposes of line drawing. Id.
92.

Id.

93. CompareNat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (denying relief even though the
advisory committee was composed entirely of industry representatives), and Sanchez v. Pena,
17 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.N.M. 1998) (finding the balance question nonjusticiable in the context
of a committee with at least "some" representation of a plaintiffs' point of view), with Nw.
Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL
33526001 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999) ("The court, therefore, orders the USTR to make a good
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interest representation is also disconcerting, given the extensive conflict-ofinterest screening processes built into FACA. 94
Looking to congressional or agency delimitation of the function and
relevant interests of a committee would theoretically make it easier to
determine what the directly affected interests are, but the approach has
proven unworkable. This solution seems attractive, since U.S. General
Services Administration regulations require agencies to take such action
themselves. 95 But even courts agreeing with this basic idea come to
drastically different conclusions. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in CPATH
appeared to endorse both Wenker's and Cargill's general reasoning that
agency regulations, organic statutes, and committee charters may make
judicial review possible. 96 Nevertheless, the court distinguished the case
before it on the basis that the Trade Act failed to provide guidance specific
enough to allow for judicial review, 97 despite the fact that the Trade Act
provided fairly specific membership guidelines. 98 The differences between
the statutory guidance in CPATH and the regulatory guidance in Wenker
and Cargill were in fact negligible. CPATH thus illustrates that, without
any serious attempt by a court to explain its reasoning, future litigants are
left taking shots in the dark.
B. PracticalUnenforceability

Even when courts do allow section 5(b)(2) claims to go forward, they issue stem warnings to future reviewing courts to afford considerable
deference to agencies' staffing of committees. 99 Thus, even where courts
reach the merits of a case, they leave the provision without any real bite. In
Cargill,for instance, the Fifth Circuit followed its articulation of an expansive view of the judicial role in section 5(b)(2) cases with an exhortation for

faith effort to expedite the appointment of at least one properly qualified environmental representative to each of the forest product ISACs as soon as possible." (emphasis added)).
94. See generally Croley & Funk, supra note 21, at 495-501.
95. 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.60(a)(3) (2010) (requiring agencies to consult with the secretariat
regarding a "plan to attain fairly balanced membership," which must ensure that "the agency
will consider a cross-section of those directly affected, interested, and qualified, as appropriate
to the nature and functions of the advisory committee").
96. Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We therefore find Wenker persuasive only
to the extent that it suggests that additional regulations might, in some circumstances, be sufficient to result in a reviewable controversy under the APA.").
97. Id.
98. CPATH, 540 F.3d at 945.
99. See, e.g., Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d
419, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Cargill,
Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 335 n.24, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).
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deference, and then summarily disposed of the challenger's arguments. 1°°
These are mixed signals, but one reasonable interpretation of them is that
even when courts are convinced that they should not be abdicating the judicial role, they are still uncomfortable making the actual determinations
about which interests deserve representation and when balance is achieved.
A simple rule of deference provides an easy way out of this dilemma, but
only at the cost of leaving the provision effectively unenforced.
C. PerverseIncentives

Courts may be encouraging a move away from open and accountable
agency action when they hold that statutory or regulatory material specifying the function or the relevant interests for a given committee may make
section 5(b)(2) justiciable as applied to the committee. The message is clear:
litigation can be avoided by agencies that decline to narrow the function and
the categories of affected interests explicitly. Of course, it is a wellestablished principle of administrative law that nonjusticiable provisions can
become justiciable when agencies take official action to limit their own discretion, since agency action amounts to the meaningful standard needed to
avoid nonjusticiability.'0 Nevertheless, the incentives furthered by this principle veer away from the good-government purposes of FACA. First, the
approach penalizes agencies that are forthcoming about their committees'
functions and composition by subjecting them to judicial review. Second,
the approach leaves the most egregiously black-box committees unchecked.
Third, the approach reflexively validates and reifies potentially illegitimate
decisions by agencies (themselves potentially captured or biased) about appropriate purposes and relevant interests. In this sense, the functional
approaches advanced by some courts in recent cases undermine the purposes of FACA more than simply letting section 5(b)(2) lie dormant.
D. Dichotomization of Science and Politics

Courts show deeply rooted, somewhat antiquated beliefs about the proper purpose of advisory committees when they follow the representational
reading and decline to review committee balance. The classic narrative
treats advisory committees as sources of scientific or other technical expertise for a government otherwise unable to find neutral, competent, and costeffective information and advice. °2 An extreme version of this technocratic
view of committees is Adrian Vermeule's argument that agencies ought to be
100. See Cargill, 173 F.3d at 337 (rejecting an argument that the committee needed particularized expertise, and instead finding, under a posture of deference, that the presence of
scientific generalists was sufficient).
101.
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
102. See, e.g., Joe G. Conley, Conflict of Interest and the EPA 's Science Advisory Board,
86 TEx. L. REV. 165, 165 (2005) ("[Slince scientific assessments by agencies are often surrounded by heated politics, science advisory boards are viewed as a key mechanism for
independent and neutral scientific review that is insulated from political pressure.").
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bound by the decisions rendered by a majority vote of expert committees. 103
Especially during the Bush administration, popular commentary was replete
with accusations of scientific impurity in the advisory complex, and that
commentary often advocated for an objective, neutral, and technocratic view
of the role of science in policymaking. 1" Scholars, too, have strongly criticized the logic of representation vis-a-vis advisory committees' 5 and even
expressed skepticism about the idea that "balance" requires balancing scientific disciplines in committee representation. In short, the prevailing view of
the advisory process has little tolerance for the kind of overtly political representational balancing that section 5(b)(2) might seem to mandate.
Courts in section 5(b)(2) cases have implicitly made an analogous assumption that the idea of "balance" on an expert committee is somehow
inappropriate. For example, function-based approaches resolve the problem
of representational balance by limiting the scope of a committee's mandate
to a narrow, technical task that can be accomplished with a more homogenous advisory committee. Courts' bias toward scientific purity is
particularly palpable when they themselves seek to define the parameters of
a committee's mission in scientific terms, as the court did in Cargill.As that
court stated, "The task of the committee-providing scientific peer reviewis politically neutral and technocratic, so there is no need for representatives
from the management of the subject mines to serve on the committee."' 1 6 It
is worth recalling that the committee in Cargill was convened to provide
scientific studies with direct implications for regulations on mining operations and that the committee was severely criticized by scientists affiliated
with the challenging group. 10 7 Given these facts, the court's treatment of the
question of representation seems rather flippant and dismissive. Similarly, in
Microbiological Criteria, Judge Friedman overlooked the science-neutral
language of section 5(b)(2) and simply noted that "[s]ince the Committee's
function in this case involves highly technical and scientific studies and recommendations, a 'fair balance' of viewpoints can be achieved even though
the committee does not have any members who are consumer advocates or
proponents of consumer interests."'0 8
103.

Adrian Vermeule, The Parliamentof the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231 (2009).

104. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 89, at 3 (describing the "[p]ublic debate over the Bush
administration's use and abuse of expert advisory committees" as "unusually intense"); CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 227-28 (2005) (noting that the Bush administration's manipulation of advisory committees was "a sweeping and unprecedented threat to
the role of science in policymaking, and even to the legitimacy of science itself").
105.

See BRUCE L.R. SMITH, THE ADVISERS: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 199

(1992) (discussing the challenges to finding unbiased advisors); see also Anderson, supra note
16, at 35-36 (arguing that the existing selection process discourages participation by unbiased
scholars and that balancing appointees by interests is inappropriate, but showing some openness to balancing appointments by discipline).
106. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
107.

Id. at 328.

108. Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886
F.2d 419,423 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Friedman, J., concurring).
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These judicial opinions follow the federal advisory committee guidelines, which distinguish special government employees ("SGEs"), who sit
on advisory committees for their technical or scientific expertise, from representative members, who sit on advisory committees for advocacy of
particular points of view.0 9 In response to concerns that federal advisory
committees were being stacked with politically slanted representatives, the

recently suggested amendments to FACA propose ramping up this somewhat artificial distinction between SGEs and representative appointees to
make the politicization of committees more visible and open to criticism. 0
However, purging politics from advisory committees to render them
purely technical or scientific works only if one assumes, against the weight
of much modern scholarship, that science is a decisively apolitical thing.
After conducting several case studies of federal advisory committees, Sheila
Jasanoff concluded that scientists often carry with them nonscientific values
that color the advice they give." Sometimes, the politicization of science is
more instrumental." 2 The modern response-and the one clearly endorsed
by the GSA" 3 and the courts" 4 -is to purge committees of conflicts of interest

and

balance

out

residual

biases

through

representative

appointments." 5 This "proceduralization" of federal advisory committee
membership requirements "may well end up diluting the quality" of advice
rendered by committees,6 as it deters some of the most qualified potential
members from serving. 1
Instead of rehabilitating the sterile technocratic view, Jasanoff suggests
that advisory committees, even when designed to provide scientific advice,
109. BROWN, supra note 89, at 99-100 (noting the differences between these two
groups).
110. See Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2009, H.R. 1320, ll1th
Cong. (2009).
111. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH 230 (1994) ("Studies of scientific advising
leave in tatters the notion that it is possible, in practice, to restrict the advisory process to
technical issues or that the subjective values of scientists are irrelevant to decisionmaking.").
Scholarship in the sociology of science shows that scientific legitimacy is not simply a matter
of referring to neutral and objective criteria; rather, it is a complex quasi-political dance
known by scholars as the project of "boundary work." See THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL
BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE 23 (1999) ("Boundary-work is strategic practical action. As such,
the borders and territories of science will be drawn to pursue immediate goals and interests of
cultural cartographers, and to appeal to the goals and interests of audiences and stakeholders.
Insider scientists use boundary-work to pursue or protect several different 'professional'
goals.").
112. See, e.g., MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY (1986) (arguing that
uncertainty and lack of clear information can be selectively wielded by competing interests to
slow down regulation or otherwise further the interest groups' objectives).
113. See Croley & Funk, supra note 21, at 495-99 (outlining GSA regulations concerning conflicts of interest in advisory committee appointments).
114. See supra Part I (describing the case law surrounding section 5(b)(2) as refusing to
review the representational appointment schemes created by agencies).
115. Anderson, supra note 16, at 35-36.
116. Id.
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should conduct their work as a "hybrid activity that combines elements of
scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social and political
'
judgment."117
The case studies make clear that the advisory process works
best when there is vibrant deliberation between scientists and the lay public.1 'IWhat is needed, then, is a standard of review that would facilitate this
kind of deliberation, and a culture of information more generally, by examining committee work product-not a standard that regresses to the artificial
distinction between experts and representatives. But the problem with such
an aspiration is obvious: it is simply contrary to the avoidance strategies
courts have developed. 19
III.

BEYOND REPRESENTATION: A DELIBERATIVE PROCESS STANDARD

The common thread in section 5(b)(2) cases-the representational reading-points the way to an alternative approach. This approach, which I call
the "deliberative process approach," would (1) give circuits inclined to find
section 5(b)(2) nonjusticiable another way to enforce the statute, and
(2) provide courts that have found the provision justiciable an alternative
approach that does not raise as many vexing policy problems. The first section below lays the textual foundation for the alternative standard;
subsequent sections consider open legal questions about the alternative
standard as well as the practical implications of such a form of review.
A. The DeliberativeProcessStandard
Section 5(b)(2) provides that any legislation "establishing, or authorizing the establishment of any advisory committee"12 must "require the
membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the
points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee. ' 121 That the provision imposes a requirement on the makeup
of committees-the assumption of the representational reading-might
seem to be the only intuitively correct interpretation. But the text of section
117. JASANOFF, supra note Ill, at 229; cf BROWN, supra note 89, at 245 ("Structuring the
process to assess and balance the social and professional perspectives of advisory committee
members, rather than according to separate standards for experts and interest group representatives, promises to help improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of government advisory

committees.").
118. JASANOFF, supra note I 1l,at 234 ("Regulatory practices at EPA and FDA support
the thesis that negotiation-among scientists as well as between scientists and the lay public-is one of the keys to the success of the advisory process.").
119. See supra Part 1.
120. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. app. (2006). Though the text
of section 5(b)(2) refers only to legislatively formed committees, courts consider the provision
applicable to executively formed committees as well. See, e.g., Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v.
Exec. Comm. of President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1073 &
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that section 5(c) of FACA makes section 5(b)(2) applicable to
executively formed committees despite the language in section 5(b)(2)).
121. § 5(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. app.
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5(b)(2) also can be understood to impose an ongoing requirement that the
membership of the committee act or have acted as a fairly balanced committee. This alternative reading follows from two major ambiguities in the
statute.
First, the provision is ambiguous because of the phrases "to be ... balanced" and "represented." If the language is read statically, or
synchronically, it suggests that members with discrete representational
viewpoints must be balanced at one point in time-namely, at the formation
of the committee.' 2 2 Interpreted this way, "balanced" is a participial adjective, synchronically describing a characteristic of a compliant committee at
the outset of its work, and "represented" is also a participial adjective, describing points of view held at the time. Alternatively, if the language is read
dynamically, or diachronically, it suggests that members of a committee
need not be representatives of fixed viewpoints determined at a discrete
point in time; legislation would be perfectly compliant with the language of
the statute if it requires that committee viewpoints represented in the course
of the committee's work are fairly balanced over time. In that case, "balanced" and "represented" have the properties of participial verbs,
diachronically referring to ongoing actions.
This observation is merely suggestive of a problem with the limited way
in which courts have conceptualized the nature of the obligation imposed by
section 5(b)(2). Its implication, however, is that a dynamic reading of the
statute expands the possibilities of judicial review beyond any one moment
and treats advisory committees as evolving institutions. If the statute is read
synchronically, the requirement of representation must be a narrow one, approximating a delegation model. Under a diachronic reading, there may be
more possibilities.
A second ambiguity in the language of section 5(b)(2) sharpens the case
for a potential nonrepresentational reading. The idea of "points of view represented" might naturally suggest a representational paradigm, in which the
committee comprises atomistic actors with exogenously determined ideal
preferences. But in a strictly textual analysis, there is no reason to insist on
that reading over a reading in which "points of view represented" are fairly
balanced during deliberation by the membership of the committee as a whole
(if the word "membership" is read as a unified singular collective noun). A
committee composed entirely of Ralph Naders could, in a truly deliberative
institution, be "fairly balanced in terms of points of view represented and
function to be performed," provided that the Ralph Naders on the committee
were able to consider and present a fair balance of viewpoints. In other
words, the statute can be read to impose a requirement that the memberships
of committees meet a substantive standard of deliberative quality, where
members simply put forth a fair balance of points of view.

122. By synchronic, I mean that the definition of "balanced" is static and keyed to one
point in time. By contrast, diachronic is used to describe an understanding of "balance" as an
ongoing requirement through time.
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It might be argued that the phrase "points of view represented" is simply
incompatible with a deliberative process approach, because it is impossible
for any individual to represent more than one viewpoint. But this assumption does not accord with the polysemous nature of the verb represent,
which can mean (1) "to serve as the official and authorized delegate or agent
for," (2) "to describe or present in words; set forth," or (3) "to present clearly to the mind."' 23 The latter two definitions permit multiple representations
to be made simultaneously. 124 The inclusion of the phrase "points of view
represented" in section 5(b)(2) thus does not necessarily mean that the people who espouse the points of view in the course of a committee's business
firmly adhere to them. Rather, it means that the membership, acting as a
body, presents, depicts, or otherwise airs a fair balance of viewpoints. The
deliberative process reading here does not require members to be blank
slates when they arrive for a meeting-in fact, deliberation will benefit from
members having some position on the issue under consideration, because
more information will come in as a consequence. The only requirement for
the representation of points of view, then, is a demonstrated open mind. A
nonrepresentational reading thus accords with the lessons drawn from some
empirical studies of ideal advisory processes,
which praise situations where
25
members of committees are protean.
This textual analysis counsels for a judicial standard that treats the question not as whether the membership of a committee is balanced ex ante
under a representational logic but as whether the membership of the committee, taken as a whole, acts or has acted as a fairly balanced body. Courts
can conduct judicial review under this reading of the statute by looking at
the work product of a committee instead of its composition. In doing so,
they can avoid the danger of crass politicization entailed by judicial calibration of representational balance. Moreover, the deliberative process standard
is based solely on section 5(b)(2), so circuits adopting such an interpretation
would have no need to refer to statutory or regulatory delimitation of function or relevant interests, thus avoiding several of the problems raised in Part
II.
The alternative reading proposed here does not preclude the representational reading implicitly adopted by the courts, but this alternative
123. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1480 (4th ed.
2000). Other dictionaries define represented in similarly divergent ways. See, e.g., NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1437 (Erin McKean ed., 2d ed. 2005) (defining represent as to
(1) "[a]ct as a substitute for (someone), esp. on an official or ceremonial occasion," (2) "([o]f a
group or type of person or thing) be present or found in something, esp. to a particular degree," or (3) "[d]escribe or depict (someone or something) as being of a certain nature").
124. Indeed, the Supreme Court has in another context refused to adopt the narrow definition of "representative" as "delegate." See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing, to no avail, that "representatives" under the Voting Rights Act
cannot include judges since they do not act on behalf of anybody as delegates).
125. See JASANOFF, supra note 11l, at 243 ("The most valued expert is one who not only
transcends disciplinary boundaries and synthesizes knowledge from several fields but also
understands the limits of regulatory science and the policy issues confronting the agency.").
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deliberative process reading is also undeniably plausible. It thus presents an
alternative theory to supplement the arsenal available to plaintiffs seeking to
hold advisory committees accountable.
Even if one is convinced that there is a textual basis for the deliberative
process reading, one might argue that this does not mean that the deliberative process reading can coexist with what appears to be an equally plausible
representational reading. Such an argument takes issue with the idea that a
court could recognize and choose between both meanings of section 5(b)(2)
when deciding whether and how to review claims under that provision. After
all, it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,' 1 26 and that duty does not permit courts to endorse two
meanings simultaneously.
The legal justification for enforcing the alternative deliberative process
reading is rather modest and does not even require a court to resolve the
textual debate with finality. Recall that the debate about section 5(b)(2) is
largely over preclusion of judicial review under the APA, and that in that
analysis there is a presumption of judicial review.127 Even assuming that the
deliberative process reading is not a better reading than the representational
reading, 128 the presumption of judicial review supports choosing the secondbest reading when the best reading provides no law to apply. First, courts
utilize a variety of interpretive methods before deciding that a statute is unreviewable, including looking to text and purpose 129 and even to "pragmatic
considerations" to draw the lines. 130 Second, courts may limit findings of
unreviewability to parts of statutes or agency actions.' In short, the standard practice is to honor the presumption in favor of reviewability by
conducting a rather searching review for any possible way to use statutory
text, legislative history, legislative purpose, and even pragmatic considerations to confirm that reviewability.
In light of the serious legal and policy problems that have emerged as a
result of the representational reading, the issue of interpretation is not nearly
as simple as it would be in a strictly textual legal world. Section 5(b)(2) sits

126.
127.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

128.

See infra Sections III.B-C for extratextual arguments that suggest that the delibera-

tive process reading is the best reading of the statute.
129. See, e.g., Cnty. of Esmeralda, Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 925 F.2d 1216, 1218-19
(9th Cir. 1991); Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Meese, 891 F.2d 1374,
1378 (9th Cir. 1989).
130.

4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:12 (3d ed.

2011). It should be noted, however, that some circuits have backed away from that approach in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988), which
suggested that courts should not go beyond the statutory text in deciding whether there are
meaningful standards. Id.
131. Ronald M. Levin, UnderstandingUnreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 701-02 (1990). The APA encourages this kind of limitation by providing that the
chapter allowing judicial review of agency action "does not apply to the extent that ...agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006) (emphasis added).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:677

dormant and practically unenforced in the courts, thereby rendering a portion of the law effectively nugatory. Moreover, not only is the deliberative
process reading textually plausible and desirable on policy grounds, but it
also finds support in the legislative history and purpose of FACA.
B. Consistency with the Purpose of FACA

Review of the legislative history of FACA shows that Congress did not
foreclose the deliberative process reading. In the 1950s, Congress considered several proposals to address industry capture of federal advisory
committees. 3 2 These early efforts eventually matured in both houses during
the Ninety-First Congress into full-fledged consideration of regulatory
packages aimed at federal advisory committees. 133 In 1970, Congress con-

sidered a bill protecting certain interest groups' representation on advisory
committees in the Bureau of the Budget. 3 4 Soon thereafter Senator Metcalf
proposed a bill that would have applied to all advisory committees and watered down the previous bill's quota approach by requiring that one-third of
members be "public" (nonindustry) representatives.135 Congress also considered two other proposed bills in the Senate and another, the Monagan
bill, in the House. 3 6 Ongoing disputes about the details yielded a "clean
bill" in the Senate, 137 which incorporated the "best features" of the three
Senate bills and, importantly, "dropped the explicit formulas for promoting
representativeness of membership."' 138 Instead the bill read, "[L]egislation
shall . .. require that membership of the advisory committee shall be repre-

sentative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of such
committee as described in such legislation.. .. -139 After unanimous approval of the compromise bill in the Senate and approval of the Monagan bill by
voice vote in the House, the two chambers entered reconciliation proceedings. 4' The conference committee's language was approved without
controversy by voice vote in both chambers and signed into law by Presi-

132.

See

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW

92-463): SOURCE BOOK 3 (1978) [hereinafter FACA SOURCE BOOK] (noting that the concern
in the 1950s centered on "potential encouragement of antitrust violations" by industrydominated advisory committees).
133. Id. at 7; see also BROWN, supra note 89, at 94-97 (reviewing portions of the

lengthy legislative history of FACA's "fairly balanced" provision and concluding that it was
only after passage that its meaning transformed into an explicitly "liberal-rationalist" provi-

sion).
134.

FACA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 132, at 7-8.

135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 9-12. The Monagan bill comes close to the current language of section
5(b)(2), requiring "fair representation of different viewpoints on every committee." Id. at 13.
137.

Id. at 15 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-1098, at 4 (1972)).

138.
139.
140.

Id. at 15-16.
S. 3529, 92d Cong. § 5(b) (1972).
FACA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 132, at 17-18.
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dent Nixon on October 6, 1972.141 Despite the critical differences between
the Monagan bill and the Senate's compromise bill with respect to the use of
membership quotas, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference
Committee did not include any mention of the subject of the "fairly balanced" provision among its numerous explanations of compromises
between the Senate and the House in the final bill. 42 Neither did Congress
provide any definition of any of the key terms of the provision.
Though the complete history of FACA is replete with conflicting sig143
nals, courts in section 5(b)(2) cases zeroed in on a Senate Report
accompanying S. 3529 to support the representational reading. From this
single report, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, as the "legislative history
makes clear, the 'fairly balanced' requirement was designed to ensure that
persons or groups directly affected by the work of a particular advisory
committee would have some representation on the committee."'" But this
Senate Report refers to S.3529, which had very different language from the
Monagan bill that eventually became FACA after reconciliation. The court
also referenced a House Report on the Monagan bill 4 5 that does not raise
the same problems, but which is also far less supportive of the representational reading. 146 The statement cited in the House report in support of the
representational reading is as opaque as the language of section 5(b)(2) of
FACA itself.
The legislative material does shed light on Congress' overall purpose in
passing the "fairly balanced" provision, and that purpose is consistent with
the deliberative process reading. The House Report on the Monagan bill
broadly states that the purpose of the provision is to protect against the danger that special interests might use their membership on committees to
"promote their private concerns." 47 As scholars have similarly noted, FACA
as a whole is about promoting "even-handedness" or "impartiality." t " This
broad aspiration is all that the language of the bill and the legislative history
can definitively support. Ultimately, the drafters of section 5(b)(2) left the
door open for alternatives to the direct interest representation model, and
neither practice nor practicality requires shutting that door now.
141. Id. at 19.
142. H.R. REP. No. 92-1403 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3508.
143. S. REP. No. 92-1098, reprinted in FACA SOURCE BooK, supra note 132, at 159
("[L]egislation shall ...require that membership of the advisory committee shall be representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of such committee ....
").
144. Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey
on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 1073 n.1 (citing H.R. REP.No. 92-1017 (1972)).
146. FACA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 132, at 276. The report complains about a particular committee meeting where only industry representatives were present. This is simply
anecdotal evidence of the kind of imbalance that Congress was worried about and cannot be
interpreted to compel a representational means to solve the problem, let alone to exclude other
interpretive glosses on the bare language of the Monagan bill.
147. Id. at 276.
148. See Croley & Funk, supra note 21, at 452-53.
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C. PostenactmentHistory

Many agencies do currently implement FACA as narrowly read to
require interest representation. As mentioned before, the GSA formally
distinguishes SGEs from representative members. 49 Enabling legislation
"sometimes uses the term represent to mean speak for a particular
constituency, such as labor or business, and sometimes to mean standfor a
particular body of knowledge or scientific discipline."' 50 The FACA fair
balance cases are not terribly out of step with current practice, then, when
they assume that what must be balanced are these kinds of representatives of
directly affected interests. 5'
But despite this tradition of using the representational reading, 5 2 some
government actions have still assumed that FACA was designed to battle the
dangers of capture and domination specifically by promoting deliberation.
Most notably, the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") has "emphasize[d] the epistemic rather than partisan reasons for including lay
perspectives" on its commlittees.1 53 The NAS-the parent agency of many
federal advisory committees-categorically denies that direct interest representation has any role to play on committees: "[N]o one is appointed by the
institution to a study committee to represent a particular point of view or
special interest."'154
Recent GSA regulations also support the notion that at least one major
purpose of advisory committees is to foster deliberation. For instance, the
GSA noted in 2001 that, while it believed that subcommittees of parent advisory committees are not subject to the requirements of FACA, it did
believe that subcommittee advice is subject to FACA if the parent committee does not deliberate over the advice offered by the subcommittee.' 55 The
implication is that a committee that does not deliberate is not a true committee. Moreover, the final rule imposes an affirmative duty on committee
members to act with the goals of the committee and the parent agency in
mind, 15 6 as well as to seek ways to encourage participation by promoting
149.

BROWN, supra note 89, at 99-100.

150.
151.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 97 ("The dominant approach [of courts] ... has interpreted the balance provi-

sion through a liberal-rationalist lens, conceiving fair representation in terms of a split
between expert knowledge and citizen interests.").
152.

See supra Part 11.

153.
154.

BROWN, supra note

89, at 242.
Id.at 242 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NAT'L

COMPOSITION

AND BALANCE

AND

CONFLICTS

ACADS., POLICY ON COMMiTTEE
(2003), available at http://

OF INTEREST

www.nationalacademies.org/coi/index.html).
155. Federal Advisory Committee Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,727, at 37,729 (July 19,
2001) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 101-02).
156. 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.95(b) (2009) ("Advisory committee members and staff should be
fully aware of the advisory committee's mission, limitations, if any, on its duties, and the
agency's goals and objectives. In general, the more specific an advisory committee's tasks and
the more focused its activities are, the higher the likelihood will be that the advisory committee will fulfill its mission.").
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openness. 5 7 Both of these aspirations are consistent with a deliberative
process model.
The Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") has similarly weighed in on the
question by considering whether agencies and committees may claim a
Freedom of Information Act waiver when the public seeks to obtain committee documents.158 In denying that an exemption applies in most
circumstances, OLC repeatedly refers to the working materials of committees as "deliberative materials."' 5 9
Perhaps most telling is the General Accounting Office ("GAO") report
that federal advisory committees frequently abuse FACA by appointing almost all representatives (advocates) and very few SGEs (experts).' 6 This
practice, along with insufficient vetting of prospective committee members
for conflicts of interest and for viewpoints, led the GAO to conclude in
2004 that federal advisory committees were severely lacking in the kind of
independence necessary for effective advising. 16' The GAO reconfirmed
these problems in 2008.162 Notably, the 2004 report emphasized that it is
important that committees be perceived as balanced if they are to function
effectively.163 Numerical balancing is one way to create the perception of
balance, but both litigants and the public tend to be skeptical of the formal
credentials and biases even of expert committee members. 164 From this
perspective, numerical balancing is likely to be insufficient to advance the
purposes of FACA. Evidence that an agency deliberated over all of the relevant viewpoints on the record more directly addresses the concerns of
imbalance by at least placing concrete evidence of consideration on the
record.
Courts themselves have also confirmed that a major purpose of section
5(b)(2) and of FACA in general is to foster deliberation.' 65 First, in response
to a complaint that the Clinton administration "had formed the [White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security] simply to obtain rubber-stamp endorsement of a predetermined policy agenda, rather than to
157. Id. § 102-3.95(d) ("In addition to achieving the minimum standards of public access
established by the Act and this part, agencies should seek to be as inclusive as possible. For
example, agencies may wish to explore the use of the Internet to post advisory committee
information and seek broader input from the public.").
158. See Disclosure of Advisory Comm. Deliberative Materials, 12 Op. O.L.C. 73
(1988), 1988 WL 391003 (O.L.C.).
159. See id. at 73, 75, 79.
160. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-328, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE
AND BALANCE 7 (2004) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE], available at http://

www.gao.gov/new.items/d04328.pdf,
161. Id.
162. See generally INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE, supra note 13.
163. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 5.
164. See, e.g., Letter from Melanie Sloan, supra note 9, at 2-3 (criticizing the business
interests of two doctors appointed to the TPSAC).
165. See Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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facilitate genuine deliberations,1' 66 the government argued that membership on a committee "accords no real right to participate in committee
proceedings."'' 67 Although the case was technically not a section 5(b)(2)
case, 168 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless used the opportunity to elaborate on
the purposes of FACA. The court argued that FACA was designed to ensure not only openness but also "fair deliberations.' ' 69 In suggesting that
FACA was passed to protect committees as deliberative institutions, the
court connected this abstract discussion of the purposes of FACA with sections 5(b)(2) and 5(b)(3). 70 Judge Edwards noted "a committee might be
nominally balanced, because an individual was appointed to represent certain views, but effectively unbalanced, because that individual was
precluded from meaningful participation.' 7' A second example is Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. Clinton,7 2 in which the D.C. Circuit considered whether a
trust instituted to offset legal expenses incurred by President Clinton and
First Lady Hillary Clinton was an advisory committee under the Act. The
court rejected the claim that FACA embraced such a trust, arguing on the
basis of sections 5(b)(2) and 5(b)(3) that the Act governs committees that
"provide varying points of view" on "debatable policy issues."' 73 The court
of deliberation, in which multherefore viewed advisory committees as sites
174
tiple points of view must be demonstrated.
D. A ManageableStandard?

Even if a deliberative process standard is legally justified, the question
remains whether it can helpfully guide courts in reviewing the record. In
practice, the deliberative process standard would require plaintiffs to allege
that a committee substantively ignored mainstream viewpoints on the subject matter of a committee meeting. Courts would then have to identify the
subject matter of a meeting, decide what the important viewpoints on the
166. Id. at 287.
167. Id. at 291.
168. See id. at 289. The only claims that the appeals court heard were that the plaintiff
was denied access to information relied upon by the commission and that this affected her
ability to effectively dissent from commission findings. Id.
169. Id. at291.
170. Id. (citing Federal Advisory Committee Act, § 5(b)(2)-(3), 5 U.S.C. app. (2006)
("[T]he advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately
influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest.")). Section 5(b)(3) has been
interpreted to serve as a buffer around committees. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d
1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004).
171. Cummock, 180 F.3d at 291.
172. 76 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
173. Judicial Watch, 76 F.3d at 1233 (emphasis omitted).
174. Indeed, taken to a logical extreme, the language used by the court compels a deliberative process approach. One could imagine a committee fairly balanced in terms of
representation but wholly in agreement on the matter at hand. The language in Clinton suggests that this "committee" would not really be a committee because there was no exchange of
ideas.
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issue are, and review the record to see if there is evidence that the committee

considered the major viewpoints or if it myopically focused on a limited
subset of them. Courts can handle this task, for they have long engaged in
practically the same kind of review in certain species of administrative law
cases.

The clearest analogy is to informal rulemaking under the APA.17 5 The
term "informal" in this context is a bit of a misnomer, as courts have layered
both procedural and substantive requirements onto the process over the

years. Many of these additional requirements are explicitly designed to encourage deliberation and public participation, as well as to give judges a
metric by which to assess agency compliance. 17 6 First, under the APA, agen-

cies must give notice of proposed rulemakings, opportunity for comment,
and a statement of basis and purpose. 17 7 Courts typically require much more
than this sparse statutory language suggests. Especially on the D.C. Circuit,
the notice requirement requires agencies to include sufficient detail to facili-

17
tate a fully developed consideration of the issues at stake. ' The D.C.
Circuit's encouragement of deliberation on this point is explicit. 79 Similarly,

review under the statement of basis and purpose provision requires agencies
to respond to significant comments. 18° That such review should facilitate
deliberation was plainly the goal of the court. 1 '
After an agency promulgates a regulation, courts review the process by
which the agency came to a final conclusion under "hard look review,"' 82
175.

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).

See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 276 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining
that, in the post-1968 era, "[t]he participation of interested parties in rulemakings is seen both
as an end in itself and as a means by which flaws in the agencies' thinking can be brought to
the attention of the agencies-and, eventually, to the reviewing court").
177. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
178. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250,
1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the notice requirements in the APA "are designed (1) to
ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure
fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence
in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial
review"); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (interpreting the
notice requirements as applied to a proposed EPA rule).
179. See HBO, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T]here must be an exchange of views, information, and criticism between interested persons and the agency.
Consequently, the notice required by the APA... must disclose in detail the thinking that has
animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is based.").
180. E.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("An agency need not address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner
to those that raise significant problems.").
181. See Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("[I]f the judicial review which Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, the 'concise general statement of basis and purpose' . . . will enable us to see what major
issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to
them as it did." (emphasis added)).
182. "Hard look review" is a term scholars have used to describe this species of review,
though the term itself does not appear in many cases. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
176.
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and here again, deliberative aspirations emerge. Some scholars divide hard
look review into "prescriptive" and "evaluative" varieties.183 The former
looks at whether an agency "relied on the wrong factors or failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem," and the latter looks at whether the
agency's technical explanation of its rule is implausible. 184 In both cases, but
especially in the prescriptive variety of review, courts look to the record
primarily to gauge whether the agency acted in good faith to consider a fair
balance of viewpoints on the question at issue. Today, that task sometimes
leads courts even to take a hard look at an agency's reason for not regulat85
ing.1
If courts are willing to look at the record in detail at various stages of the
informal rulemaking process to determine whether the agency has sufficiently considered important viewpoints, then there is little reason to deny that
kind of review in FACA cases.1 8 6 That courts have the ability to determine
which comments are significant enough to compel an agency response suggests that courts could make the threshold determination of what viewpoints
matter in FACA cases. The judicial function in APA informal rulemaking
cases is virtually indistinguishable from the kind of review suggested

Deossfication: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEx. L. REV. 483, 490-91 (1997). For a classic application, see Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The function of the
court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned considerationto all the material facts and
issues." (emphasis added)). The general thrust of hard look review was endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1983. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (clarifying that a rule will be set aside as arbitrary if "the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise").
183. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REV. 525, 540-41 (1997).
184. Id.
185. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
186. The cases are not precisely analogous because the rulemaking record is a paper
hearing and FACA activities are primarily conducted in in-person meetings. Hence, the deliberative process standard, to be workable, might impose a heavy burden on agencies by
requiring them to produce a paper record of in-person meetings. But advisory committees
already have to take positive steps toward timely release of committee records and committee
work product. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, § 10(b), 5 U.S.C. app. (2011) (requiring
records, reports, transcripts, minutes, etc., to be made available to the public); Food Chem.
News v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (requiring
agencies to comply with section 10(b) of FACA by releasing certain documents at the meeting
and generally holding that compliance with section 10(b) should be timely so as to further the
purpose of meaningful public participation); Memorandum for Committee Management Officers (Mar. 14, 2000), available at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/100785 (prohibiting
delay in release of non-exempt documents under the Freedom of Information Act's request
and review process and generally requiring "maximum timely availability" of committee materials).
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here.' 7 The only difference is that the advisory process is broader in scope
than informal rulemaking: advisory committees are generally formed to
consider a wider range of issues than any single rulemaking will ever consider. If anything, then, the nature of the advisory process makes judicial
review of advisory committees' breadth of consideration and deliberation
more fitting.
E. PotentialProblems

It is worthwhile to reflect on the potential limits of the deliberative process standard. First, although the analogy to APA informal rulemaking is
clear, not all administrative law scholars favor the courts' behavior in APA
cases, and their objections would be equally applicable here. Second, the
real benefit of the deliberative process approach is that it forces advisory
committees to think publicly about the full range of arguments on a given
regulatory issue. These kinds of procedural requirements do not always
yield optimal results, though, and federal advisory committees may not respond well to judicial prodding. Finally, although the deliberative process
standard avoids the nonjusticiability problem, it may yield an apparent absurdity: that a committee could be compliant with section 5(b)(2) and be
homogenous in membership.
As for the first problem, scholarly opinion is deeply divided on the propriety of the extratextual standards imposed by courts in the last fifty
years, 88 but the fact that there is substantial disagreement may suggest that
extension of this kind of judicial review to FACA cases is feasible from a
policy perspective. Furthermore, the very fact that advisory committee action is not the end of the line in the regulatory process makes review less
problematic than aggressive review of final rules. The potential dangers of
ossification of agency rulemaking through judicial review are particularly
acute because the review comes so late in the process, when agencies have
already spent tremendous time, money, and energy. Indeed, informational
requirements applicable late in the process are objectionable because they
187. As a practical matter, these cases would probably be brought under the APA, as
some cases find federal advisory committee action, such as issuing reports, to be final agency
action under APA section 704 even though such action is not directly connected to an agency
rule. See, e.g., Idaho Wool Growers Assoc. v. Schafer, 637 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872-73 (D. Idaho
2009) (holding that operation of a committee is itself final agency action even if it is not a
preliminary step toward any concrete action of the parent agency), order clarified,CV 08-394S-BLW, 2009 WL 3806371 (D. Idaho Nov. 9,2009).
188. Some argue that the courts have unnecessarily "ossified" agency rulemaking and
thwarted the legislative victories of progressive majorities by bogging down the agencies in a
Sisyphean task. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 183, at 528-29. Others believe that aggressive
judicial review is necessary to prevent capture or domination of agencies. See Merrill, supra
note 14, at 1070-74 (describing the ways in which more judicial-review-friendly scholars
responded to public choice); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bu-

reaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547-50 (1992). Recent empirical evidence
suggests that the ossification thesis is generally somewhat overblown. See Jason Webb Yackee
& Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Proceduresand BureaucraticPerformance: Is Federal
Rule-making "Ossified"?, 20 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2010).
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contribute to what scholars have termed "information capture" and "filter
failure." 18 9 Those concerns are not present to the same degree in the context
of FACA. 190 Flagging deficiencies earlier in the process would probably
streamline, not obstruct, the regulatory process.
The second potential problem--compliance with the deliberative mandate-is more troubling. The success of procedural requirements designed
to force bureaucratic agencies to consider certain factors depends on a variety of other contextual factors, and it may be that the deliberative process
approach will not be effective in the specific context of federal advisory
committees. Because the deliberative process standard requires only that the
members of a committee consider all possible perspectives or viewpoints,
courts will have no way to ensure that there was actual deliberation except
to review the transcripts of meetings. Unbalanced but savvy committees
may become expert at simply going through the motions and creating the
illusion of deliberation in the transcripts. Alternatively, as in some other
contexts in which statutes impose deliberative duties on agencies,' 91 agen-

cies may simply ignore the requirements outright. 192
These objections are unconvincing for three reasons. First, while it may
be true that courts will miss an actual lack of deliberation in a fair number
of cases, this danger of false negatives is hardly damning of the form of review. There is no reason to believe that false negatives are any more likely
with the deliberative process approach than with the representational approach, and, indeed, virtually any cause of action is subject to the problem
of false negatives. Second, the objection misses the purpose of the deliberative process standard. Fostering deliberation is a laudable goal because it
tends to create better decisionmaking on the whole.' 93 Advisory committees
are just that-advisory. To the extent that the threat of judicial review forces
committees to pay attention to various viewpoints, the process of decisionmaking when the agency actually promulgates a rule will benefit from a

189.

See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Cap-

ture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329 (2010) (describing how constituencies either strategically or
inadvertently use information to "wear [agencies] down enough to cause them to throw in
their towels and give in").
190. In fact, Professor Wagner argues that greater reliance on federal advisory committees could ameliorate information capture and filter failure problems in informal rulemaking.
See id. at 1422-24.
191. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,225, 43,255-56 (Aug. 4,
1999). If followed, the order would require agencies to "generate information relevant to the
decision to preempt" state law through regulation. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 765 (2008).
192. Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 779-86
(2004) (noting statistics showing that agencies only conduct formal federalism impact analyses in fewer than one in a hundred cases).
193. See David Estlund, Beyond Fairnessand Deliberation:The Epistemic Dimension of
Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 173, 173 (James Bohman & William
Rehg eds., 1997).
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richer informational environment. 94 Moreover, even if members originally
raise an issue simply to avoid judicial review, it does not follow that they
will not learn from the deliberation and perhaps change their minds. 195 Finally, as for the danger that agencies and committees may simply ignore the
requirements, there is good reason to discount that possibility. Studies of the
effectiveness of deliberative approaches confirm that compliance is determined mainly by institutionalization of the capacity to process the new
information.196 Institutionalization makes it difficult for an organization to
ignore procedural requirements even when courts are not able to police every possible violation. 97 There is no way to be sure that the deliberative
process standard as applied to federal advisory committees will lead to more

deliberation, as the answer to that question will likely depend on the institutional characteristics of specific advisory committees. Yet federal advisory
committees are already convened to consider specific questions; imposing a
deliberative process requirement on these committees does not throw in a

radically new variable separate from the issues under consideration. Even
the most fundamentally numerically unbalanced committee will be aware of
and competent to analyze most of the potential angles on an issue, and con-

cern about judicial review should carry enough deterrent effect to convince
its members to review those angles and thereby augment the information

gathering process.
The third potential problem is not really a problem at all. Substituting a
deliberative process standard for a representational standard would mean

that committees could be compliant without appointing a single member
from certain important groups. As counterintuitive as this result might seem,

we must guard against romanticizing the legacy of the representational reading. All of the circuits that have thus far decided section 5(b)(2) cases have
either found the provision nonjusticiable, adopted such a deferential standard of review that few cases could ever succeed, or simply punted on the
issue. In some of these cases, the committees were strikingly homogenous,
194. See Cass R. Sunstein, InformationalRegulation and InformationalStanding: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 624-26 (1999) (arguing that informational regulation
lowers informational barriers to citizen participation in regulation).
195. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)
("Simply by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental consequences of a proposed
project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to
be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.").
196. The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") has been a success despite the
relatively onerous nature of its requirements largely because agencies institutionalized the
expertise needed to consider every potential angle of every potential environmental problem
and because outside interests mobilized to monitor agency compliance. See SERGE TAYLOR,
MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK

251 (1984). On the other hand, Executive Order 13,132

failed to change agency consideration of the federalism implications of regulatory preemption
because agencies have not internalized the specialized expertise necessary to carry out that
mandate. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 192, at 781-86.
197. TAYLOR, supra note 196, at 252 (defining the sociological concept of "institutionalization" and noting that the institutionalization of "precarious organizational values" often
depends on the "interplay between internal and external factors").
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and yet the representational reading has provided no answer with which
courts are universally comfortable. It would be inconsistent to criticize the
deliberative process standard for allowing what is already allowed by the
current approaches. Moreover, compliance with the deliberative process
standard would, as a practical matter, likely encourage agencies to staff
committees heterogeneously (thus meeting the requirements of the representative model), as that would be the easiest way to ensure that important
angles on issues are considered.
CONCLUSION

It is worth returning to the TPSAC episode and considering what is
gained by acknowledging a deliberative process reading of section 5(b)(2).
The tobacco industry's accusations of overrepresentation of pharmaceutical
industry interests on the conmnittee, and public interest groups' accusations
of overrepresentation of industry interests in general, simply cannot be resolved neatly, if they can be resolved at all. Even if the committee toggles its
membership to accommodate the concerns of its critics, new imbalances of
interests, perhaps unforeseeable at the moment, may emerge. Courts have
thus far rightly stayed out of these battles about numerical balance by finding section 5(b)(2) either nonjusticiable or justiciable and subject to
substantial deference. But the problems of capture and domination are real
even if representational imbalance is an imprecise and problematic measure
of them. If courts are worried about capture or domination of the advisory
process-and they should be-then they should adopt a deliberative process
approach to section 5(b)(2) cases.

